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THE ABORTION DEBATE 
by Laura A. Gembolis 
The controversy surrounding abortion has become a highly volatile 
debate, placing two abstract rights against each other. The argument is 
presented in terms of a dichotomy: a fetus's right to life and a woman's right 
to choose. With these two arguments as the basic premise for the public 
debate, the public question of abortion wrestles with legal or moral 
permissibility, with references to Supreme Court decisions or papal 
statements. On a private level, as I will show, the question of abortion often 
does not ask if abortion is right or wrong, but whether it is the best action of 
. several in particular circumstances. Consequently, the private question that 
women or couples ask themselves is much less concerned with placing a fetus's 
life against a woman's autonomy. The public and private terms of the debate 
often seem oddly disassociated. This separation between the public and 
private question of abortion, plus the intensity of the public debate, makes a 
resolution between public principles and private realities difficult to imagine. 
There may, however, be possible reconciliation between the private approach 
and the public approach. In examining the possible cause for this breach, I 
will show how the Japanese Buddhist mizuko kuyo, a public ritual which 
acknowledges the private difficulties in choosing abortion, may serve as a 
possible model for American moral thinking on this issue. 
First, the abortion debate should be placed in its larger social context, an 
American, Judea-Christian, twentieth-century understanding. Alasdair 
Macintyre deems our present debates on ethics to be "emotivist" in tenor. In 
describing the emotivism of our debates, Macintyre presents three 
distinguishing characteristics of today's public debates. The first asserts that 
because there is no rational way to compare positions, we can arbitrarily 
assume one. Once a position is assumed, the individual then accepts the 
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current arguments for it. The second characteristic is the tacit claim that the 
arguments are for positions that are both impersonal and logical. The third 
characteristic is that these arguments are separated from their larger historical 
context. Thus, today's moral arguments show a fragmentary understanding of 
moral problems. Together these characteristics produce contradictory moral 
judgments that are falsely understood to be objective, impersonal and rational 
moral discussions. Therefore, Macintyre claims that the emotivist 
assumptions for debate are wholly irrational. 
Presenting three positions within the abortion controversy, Macintyre 
places the specific question of abortion within the "slightly shrill tone ... of 
moral debate" in general (8). The first position asserts an understanding 
based on a woman's right to choose. It argues a woman must have full 
autonomy of her body, including all reproductive choices. The second 
position argues against an individual acceptance of abortion but refuses to 
deny the choice to another woman. It is uncomfortable arguing that abortion 
is morally permissible, but this position does not argue to make abortion 
illegal. The last position believes life begins at conception, making abortion a 
moral wrong for any reason. This position equates abortion to murder. 
These are the three general positions in the abortion debate as Macintyre 
presents it. While I agree with Macintyre's overall description of today's 
ethical debates, I believe he inaccurately presents each position as equally 
emotivist and irrational. In order to make his larger argument, Macintyre 
inadequately presents the second position as a simplified synthesis of a 
complex range of possible positions, many of which are rational and moral. 
In their attempts to justify their positions, our public servants and activists 
often explore the difficult question of when life begins. Macintyre's positions 
one and three above are forced to make logical but somewhat arbitrary 
demarcations. The first position, in its extreme form, argues that life begins 
at birth. Thus, abortion is acceptable at any point during pregnancy. The 
third position asserts that life begins at conception, making abortion 
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unacceptable at any point. A newly conceived zygote is given the same status 
as a fully formed fetus, despite the actual differences in development. In an 
attempt to simplify the situation for the purposes of public debate, both 
positions attempt to define the beginning of life at a precise point. In arguing 
over the moment at which life begins, the public debate simplifies abortion to 
imply that this is the essence of the debate. If we can determine when life 
begins, the debate implies that the issue of abortion will be resolved. 
From Maclntyre's thesis, these arbitrary definitions of life and the 
positions which follow from them are assumed like masks, in order for a 
participant to proceed in the public debate. This "theatrical" public debate, 
however, only permits individuals qua citizens to participate. Private 
individuals, concerned with actual or particular implications of abortion in 
their lives, are closed out of this larger debate. Macintyre believes the result 
is that "We could not safely infer what someone who uttered a moral 
judgment was doing merely by listening to what he said" (14). Because of the 
emotivist and histrionic tenor of the public debate, it has become too difficult 
for American citizens to recognize the legitimacy of positions not their own, 
without risking damage to the masks they have assumed. Thus, the public 
debate is not so much a rational dialogue but a dramatic event with points and 
counter-points being made by organizations like Operation Rescue and 
. NOW Even when the arguments are not as rational as they appear, 
participants must insist upon their validity in order to retain the safety 
provided by the public mask. To assume a mask in this public debate indicates 
that one has not resolved his or her private understanding of the matter, to 
which Macintyre attributes the shrillness of the debate. Even when one has a 
private understanding, the rational voice is either unheard in a public debate 
or reduced to terms which understand only the rehearsed arguments of the 
point-counterpoint drama. 
While it is often necessary to take a public position of "pro-life" or "pro-
choice," the public debate has been distorted by these narrow interpretations 
of the two sides. The rhetoric of the two extremes fails to capture the 
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complexities of the issue. Nevertheless, there is the ambiguous second 
position, presented by Macintyre, which recognizes abortion as morally 
wrong but legally permissible. Macintyre's second position may suffer in 
exactness because it often reflects innumerable understandings of the issue. 
For purposes of his argument, Macintyre has simplified this ambiguous 
position, which is often presented as an attempt to compromise the two 
extremes. Many attempts to clarify this compromise of the two extremes have 
been accused of lacking the clarity and rationality of the other two positions. 
Within the simplified second position that Macintyre presents, there is a 
recognition that abortion is an issue which lies outside of the limited 
dichotomous choice between a fetus's life and a woman's autonomy. In this 
case, although a particular individual would not have an abortion, she does 
not recognize this as a reason to prohibit another woman from making that 
choice. Thus, an individual may tolerate abortion in general but want to 
recognize limits on its practice in specific circumstances. These limitations 
vary among agents and may include a mixture of possibilities, including 
requiring parental consent or mandatory counseling or considering the health 
of the mother, the circumstances of conception, the developmental stage of 
the fetus or the health of the fetus. This position understands the question of 
abortion to be too complicated to be resolved merely by the logical deduction 
of when life begins. In recognizing abortion as a brutal act, there is still the 
recognition of its being a choice someone has thought about and may be 
willing to make. Indeed, the legal parameters cannot account for all that is 
included in the moral question of abortion. 
While Macintyre has valid concerns, I believe an examination of his 
ambiguous second position will connect the public and private debate. I 
believe it can be compared to Carol Gilligan's ethics of care and responsibility. 
I would assert that Macintyre's second position is actually a pragmatic attempt 
to bring together theoretical and private concerns. To do this, I am going to 
compare the concerns of women who have had abortions with the Japanese 
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tradition of mizuko kuyo. In this comparison, I hope to reveal the private 
complexities of the abortion issue, complexities that are strangely missing 
from the public debate. First, however, I would like to examine Maclntyre's 
simplification and dismissal of the second position, which is also commonly 
done in the public debate. 
This dismissal of the ambiguous second position by Macintyre is 
comparable to Kohlberg's readings of moral development, presented by 
Gilligan in In a Different Voice. In Gilligan's reexamination of Kohlberg's 
work, she argues that his scoring failed to understand the responses to 
hypothetical moral dilemmas provided by women and girls. As a result, 
"most of responses fall through the sieve of Kohl berg's scoring 
system"(Gilligan 31). Similarly, Maclntyre's second position in the abortion 
debate is figured in a vague manner which has difficulty acknowledging 
women's responses. I would like to argue that his inability to fully articulate 
the varieties of moral thinking included in his second position in the public 
debate is similar to Kohlberg's placing answers outside his stages of moral 
development. Women considering abortion find it difficult to accept the 
dichotomous parameters presupposed by the question presented to them. 
For both Kohlberg and Macintyre, morality remains within masculine 
parameters which define ethics in terms of rights and principles. This 
neglects a feminine understanding of the issue. 
While Kohlberg presented six stages to moral development, his accuracy 
is questionable because few people proceed past the third and fourth stage. 
According to Gilligan, Kohlberg's analysis of moral development assumed a 
masculine model. His theory of developmental stages was established by the 
examination of boys; "females simply do not exist" in the study (Gilligan 18). 
Women in particular, according to Kohlberg, rarely proceeded past the third 
stage. At this third stage, "morality is conceived in interpersonal terms and 
goodness is equated with helping and pleasing" (Gilligan 18). Women are 
morally praised for their ability to help and please others, yet paradoxically 
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these traits become, according to the six stages of moral reasoning, indicative 
of women's inability to develop fully their morality. 
Gilligan asserts that women interpret and thus answer moral questions 
differently than suggested by Kohlberg's examples. Gilligan then examines 
the moral reasoning of women to establish an ethics emphasizing care and 
responsibility. In her paradigm, a moral agent is aware of the consequences of 
her actions within her community. Another important characteristic of this 
approach is the consideration by an individual of her self-perception and of 
the perception of her by others as a morally good person. In this 
development of moral reasoning, social relationships are of central 
importance both to a woman's identity and to her moral choices. For 
example, when a woman considers abortion, she may ask: What is best for the 
child? What is best for my friends and family? What is best for me? The 
answers to these questions often overlap with each other. Thus, an ethics of 
care does not keep the question within the paradigm of rights to determine 
whether a woman's right to choose or a fetus's right to live is more important. 
Maclntyre's second position, like Kohlberg's third stage, recognizes a 
relationship between the fetus and the woman who has decided to have an 
abortion. This position, caught between the simplicity of "pro-choice" and 
"pro-life," attempts to assert a complex moral understanding within a system, 
which often demands simplification for legal and political purposes. 
Even when the fetus is considered a person, those sympathetic to abortion 
remain caught in discussing the issue in terms of principles. In Judith Jarvis 
Thomson's and Jane English's essays on abortion (1971, 197 5), there is a 
recognition of the fetus as a human. Both essays provide examples in which 
society has determined it acceptable to kill an innocent life. As these 
arguments remain concerned with the paradigm of principles, their premises 
remain bound to the theoretical debate and its legal implications. While both 
essays offer good legal arguments, neither essay attempts to approach the 
private uncertainty of abortion's moral implications. It is this emphasis on 
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legal implications and the corresponding avoidance of the private ones that 
keeps the public and private debates strangely separated. 
As I understand it, Maclntyre's second position is an attempt to articulate 
the concerns which led to the development of mizuko kuyo. While I have 
presented this as a particularly feminine understanding, Maclntyre's second 
position is not limited to women. In an anonymous essay, a father presented 
his understanding of his daughter's pregnancy, the result of a brutal gang-
rape. His essay was directed at specific legislation passed in 1981, a law that 
restricts Medicaid from funding abortion even in cases of rape or incest. He 
describes the senators' actions as emotivist: 
They are not seeing the human beings involved. 
They're not seeing the love. They're not seeing 
affection. They're not seeing goodness of heart. 
They're not seeing family-they're not seeing the care 
of a mother and a father. They're not seeing anything 
except some batty feeling that the only thing that 
matters is the unborn. They have no concern for the 
born-that is my daughter, her mother, me. 
(anonymous, qtd. Bonavoglia 183) 
Unable to be fully comprehended in the public debate, there is great 
frustration for individuals in the second position. 
The mizuko kuyo, however, provides an example of (1) a therapeutic 
possibility for women who have had abortions and (2) an opening of the 
public debate to reflect better the private debate a pregnant woman 
undergoes. The mizuko kuyo is performed after a woman has had an abortion, 
when she makes an after-the-fact apology to the child through Jizo. This 
ritual was practiced covertly when abortion was illegal in Japan, but it had 
been a carefully maintained tradition for women as early as Japan's medieval 
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period. While the American debate on abortion attempts to determine the 
beginning of life on a linear model, the Buddhist view of life as cyclical, which 
influences the Japanese ritual, has different implications for the abortion 
discussion. Life is not destroyed in abortion but becomes "recycled," with the 
spirit sent back to nirvana (LaFleur, Liquid Life 3 5). Although this model is 
particularly prevalent in Eastern thought, it is also present in Western women 
who have chosen to have an abortion. 
Several issues stated by American women who have chosen to abort their 
children are reflected in mizuko kuyo. As the Western understanding of 
abortion frames the debate, a woman who decides to have an abortion must 
believe abortion to be "right." She must assert her choice as an unequivocal 
moral decision. This understanding then denies women a right to grieve for 
an aborted child. For if a woman grieves, she has in some way acknowledged 
her action as "wrong." She must assume a "moral mask," as described by 
Macintyre. In the introduction of The Choices We Made, a book that 
features several people's personal recollections on abortion, Angela 
Bonavoglia argues that, contrary to the claims of American "abortion-rights" 
activists, the request or demand for privacy has not been dissipated with the 
legalization of abortion. Nonetheless, several women came forward in the 
book to express feelings of guilt, shame and pain. I would like to explore 
some of the overlapping concerns expressed by women who have had 
abortions and mizuko-kuyo. Because of personal sentiments in the wake of an 
abortion such as those expressed to Bonavoglia, Japanese women developed 
mizuko kuyo, a ritual to mourn the loss of the potential child. 
While the public debate focuses on determining when life begins, 
semantics become an important mark of the division between the two sides, 
with the pro-choice side using "fetus" and the pro-life side using "child." The 
public debate, in maintaining the security of a mask, must also depend upon 
maintaining the language of that mask. In contrast, women who have had 
abortions are often quite blunt in their understanding. In fact, actress Jill 
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-Clayburgh says that "a fetus is alive from the moment of conception. I don't 
think that we should say it isn't alive until such and such a week or month .... It's 
always alive" (Clayburgh, qtd. Bonavoglia 56). She continues, "It's alive, but 
that doesn't make it your responsibility to sacrifice both your life and this 
child's life. The position is not about whether or not it's alive; it's about 
whether or not someone wants to give birth and have the responsibility of 
another human being with them the rest of their life" (Claybourgh, qtd. 
Bonavoglia 5 6). While some women having abortions may consider the fetus 
to be alive, other women may only recognize the potential life. This is true 
of writer Nora Sayre, who in an interview stated, "I will add that I never felt 
the fetus was a person. I didn't then; I don't now. But naturally, you do think 
of the person who might have been" (Sayre, qtd. Bonavoglia 62). In the 
private question of abortion, language is not used to maintain a mask. 
Instead, language is used to explore the complicated understanding of what 
conception means. 
Similarly, the word mizuko reflects a symbolic understanding, which is 
reminiscent of both Clayburgh's and Sayre's understanding. La Fleur 
translates mizuko as "child of the waters," reflecting two understandings of 
the aborted fetus at once. First, water can refer to the actual fluidity of the 
fetus. Second, water can provide a symbolic mediation between life and 
death, through which the dead can be returned. La Fleur describes it as 
follows: "For generations the term has to many people seemed just right. It 
straddles and holds together both worlds; it is an acknowledgment of death 
and at the same time an expression of faith in some kind of rebirth" (La 
Fleur, Liquid 2 3 ). In mizuko kuyo, the fetus is accompanied by the 
Bodhisattva Jizo, who becomes its protector. If the life of the fetus travels 
from the fluids of the womb to the waters of our origin, the abortion may be 
understood as a journey, which reveals a complex understanding of life that 
goes beyond defining the moment of conception. 
While this journey may also suggest "resurrection, rebirth [and] 
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reincarnation," this metaphysical understanding, a significant concept in 
Eastern philosophy, is not an unfamiliar one to American women who have 
had abortions (Lafleur, Liquid 22). Anne Archer, an actress who had an 
illegal abortion, states, "the spirit of the child should wait and find another 
body, one that really wants the child to be there. It is better that the children 
come into the world with some strength around them" (Archer, qtd. 
Bonavoglia 108). Part of mizuko kuyo is asking the child to wait, and this is 
exactly what Archer includes in her understanding of her abortion. Indeed, 
the Japanese analogy is that the family, like a strong crop of rice, needs strong 
seeds and good care. The euphemism to refer to abortion is mabiki, a word 
used by rice farmers and which means "pulling the spaces." There is little use 
in having weak children or having children at the risk of the mother's life (La 
Fleur, Liquid 100). While Archer believes it is better for the child to wait, 
this analogy quickly extends that belief to assert that the choice is also better 
for the family and the mother. In this understanding, the concern for the 
"spirit of the child" reflects something like Gilligan's ethics of care and 
responsibility, which emphasizes foresight, recognizes consequences, and 
takes a whole network of individuals into account. 
As this understanding of what is best for the child becomes fuller, it 
quickly recognizes the child as an entity that will interact with a community. 
Thus, to understand abortion, it is important to recognize the actual 
particularities of the community in which the pregnant woman lives. It is the 
particularities of this environment that will be influential in her choice. For 
women in both America and Japan, the very process of considering an 
abortion seems to be accompanied by a process of self-assessment and 
community assessment. In describing her feelings about her abortion, 
Margot Kidder says, "In spite of the emotional confusion I lived through and 
the nightmares, I did not regret the abortion. I cried for the loss. I went 
through the grief. But I always knew I would not have been a good mother 
then " (Kidder, qtd. Bonavoglia 99) It is clear that, with the decision to have 
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an abortion, these women are also very aware of the brutality of the act. 
Thus, without the public pressure to assume a false sense of reconciliation 
with the act, women who ultimately choose to have abortions must, in their 
self-assessment, make sense of their choice to do something brutal and 
confront their own humanity. 
In The Choices We Made, there is the suggestion that "By and large, 
women were more afraid to reveal that they had had a legal than an illegal 
abortion"(Bonavoglia xxxii). Bonavoglia interprets this fear as indicating 
there is greater sympathy for women who have experienced illegal abortions. 
I would like to assert two additional reasons for this finding. One is that the 
present terms of the public debate prevent a woman from acknowledging her 
action. Despite abortion's being legal, the woman who actually has an 
abortion fears the accusations of immorality that surround her choice. The 
second point relates to this, in that many of the women who had illegal 
abortions are now in a social position where their age gives them more 
freedom to present their stories. Similarly, when abortion was illegal in 
Japan, mizuko-kuyo had to be practiced in secrecy. In Japan today, however, a 
woman may make her apology to the unborn child publicly, which enables 
her to acknowledge the difficulty of her choice. This action then permits a 
means to express her feelings, rather than asking her to assume a mask as a 
defense of her choice. Despite legalization, American women do not have 
this vehicle for expression of their grief and confusion. Without a means to 
express one's feelings of grief, abortion maintains a great deal of secrecy, 
contributing to the odd disassociation between the public and the private 
debate. 
While mizuko kuyo has been a long-standing tradition in Japanese culture, 
one might wonder how applicable it would be in American culture. La Fleur 
shares my interest in resolving the American abortion debate, stating, "Gary 
Chamberlain, a theologian at a Jesuit university, argues that there is a way to 
approach abortion other than that taken by Rome and the American bishops 
19 
up to the present time. He suggests that Japanese Catholic bishops have 
shown much more compassion for women and the choices they face in real 
life" (La Fleur, Abortion 44). Although the full Buddhist acceptance of a 
soul's transmigration may not be accepted into the Christian understanding, 
there is the indication that many in the Catholic church (in this case) may like 
to recognize the full complexities of abortion in a way that the mizuko kuyo 
provides. This demonstrates that we, who pose moral questions in aJudeo-
Christian framework, are able to learn from the Buddhist example. While I 
believe the Judeo-Christian understanding of abortion permeates our 
discussion, the Buddhist understanding is a powerful ritual which has proven 
to be therapeutic for women having abortions, a practice that has kept Japan 
from becoming, like the United States, socially divided by public debate. 
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